2 Ekim 2019 Çarşamba

Is it possible to create equality and private property rights together?


     I, like all people, live as me, as an individual being. But like all people, I live in a society. But which is first: Am I just responsible for myself or for society? The answer to that question determines our understanding of rights and state. If we think that our basic rights such as living, speaking or having private property is given by the state or society, then we can argue that they can be taken back by society or society can interfere with these rights. If we think that our basic rights are natural, then they are untouchable by society. This question also creates a big discussion between those who support redistributive political theories and private property rights. In this essay, I will attempt to show that we can argue that we can have private property rights and an equal society together. I will argue that our property rights are natural and untouchable but because natural resources are limited, the less advantaged group should be fed because any kind of consumption of private property right of a person limits the potential usage of property rights of others. Thus, I will try to substantiate the idea that it is possible when our rights are natural and untouchable, we can still be responsible for others. Firstly, I will explain why our right of property right is natural. In the second paragraph, I will explain why private property rights make equal society necessary and then I will look at Otsuka’s argument for liberalism without inequality and compare them with my ideas which I will reflect.

     I define property ownership right as having private right of permanent usage and transfer of a nonrational thing. Private property right seems like one of our most basic right. When we go to the forest and catch an apple, we feel that we have right of usage of the apple at least more than others. That is a universal feeling and character of human nature. When our labor interferes with a thing, we feel a kind of engagement with that thing. Assume that I live in a world and I believe that no one lives in the universe except me, I have my own house and car in this world. But then aliens, whom I did not know existed before come to my world and they ask me if they have the right to use my house and car because no social contract exists yet that makes me the owner of that house and car. Everyone would agree that there is no reason to think that I need to have social contract with aliens to be the owner of the house and car and what aliens do (using my house and car) is morally wrong. If that is true, it means that private property right does not come from society or a social contract, but it is natural. So, my argument is as follows:

1.     Private property right either comes from a social contract or it is natural

2.     Private property right can’t come from a social contract

2.a-) it is immoral to use others’ belongings (alien example)

2.b-) private property is an undeniable natural feeling (apple example)

      C. Private property right is natural

    But there are several serious possible objections to the argument. First, I probably built my house on the houses of some animals (ant, bee, etc.). But I do not think that I violate their p.p rights. So, the question might arise: What about animal rights? We should we say that humans have private property rights when other animals do not. Here followers of Kant(such as Nozick and Rawls) would use this separation of human and animal with respect to that humans have reason unlike animals, that Kantian idea makes animals out of morality and so, it is difficult to argue because it means there are no animal rights. Thus, I don’t find his solution plausible. The second possible serious objection is that we said that we naturally feel that we own something when our labor interferes with it but why does such a feeling make something right? Can natural feelings create rights? Scottish philosopher David Hume argues that our knowledge of the world does not imply how the world should be (is ought to problem)[1]. So, we cannot claim that private property is a right because any kind of reason for that proposition includes normativity. But even if objections are strong it is possible to make theological arguments for the superiority of humans and that private property is a God given right like Locke made in the first chapter of the second essay on civil government[2]. And the idea that private property right is natural is still stronger than the idea that it comes from a social contract because defenders of p.p. rights come from social contract can’t still find a sufficient explanation for the alien and apple examples.
    We concluded that private property rights are natural. It means that every political theory must respect p.p rights. Robert Nozick argues that no one can use another’s labor and that is a kind of slavery[3]. Therefore, tax cannot include services to reduce inequality or feed less advantaged groups because that would be a violation of payer’s right on his labor. In contrast, left libertarians such as Michael Otsuka think that government tax for less advantaged groups is not a violation to the p.p. right. I agree with Otsuka that taxing an advantaged group and supporting a less advantaged group is not a violation of private property rights because the sources of the world are limited and any kind of profit of the advantaged group decreases the potential profit of the less advantaged group. If we had unlimited resources, we could fairly say that we have property rights of all and Lockean proviso that everyone has the ultimate right of p.p would work in such a situation. In such a world having a private property would not violate other’s potential right of making it. But because there are no unlimited resources for anybody, we have to respect others p.p rights, otherwise we would violate their property rights and that is basically unfair. We can formulate the argument in that sense:

1-) An agent has the right of property ownership only if his ownership does not violate others p.p. rights.

2-) Having private property without making a less advantaged group better off is a violation of their possible usage of worldly resources.

C-) Private property ownership requires making a less advantaged group better off.

So, feeding a less advantaged group is a part of private property right. If we go back to our alien example, in that world, we assumed nobody exists except us but then aliens come along. We can say that until aliens come, we had the permanent right of usage of everything in the world naturally until we realized other beings. After we realized their existence, we cannot say that the world is ours and that would be a violation of their p.p. rights because the world would have been their property as well, had we not existed. To defend, their p.p. rights we accept that we need to make them better off. Because everyone has p.p. rights inborn and another necessary condition for using that right is to be alive, the advantaged group must keep other people alive, otherwise it would also be a violation of their potential p.p. rights. As a result, society must consider basic needs of agents and the advantaged group should make the less advantaged group better off when they make profit or own private property.

    This argument should not be confused with Rawls’ difference principle. In his difference principle, he argues that people can have p.p. if they make others better off. Because Rawls firstly considers how just society would be. However, I don’t plan such a just society but focus on the nature of p.p. right and its necessities. I argue that considering others’ potential property right is not for creating a just society, but it is the right itself. 

    Otsuka has shown a very important critique of Lockean proviso. He says that Lockean proviso includes the possibility of an unfree society because it is possible that one can own everything. And it is difficult to argue a libertarian argument which includes the possibility of tyranny in itself[4].

   Otsuka also argues that forced labor and p.p. right are not contradictory. He also argues that a society must be egalitarian that includes equal opportunity for welfare. His society is more egalitarian than even Rawls because he argues people should work for unfortunates to permanently have properties and that is a duty for them. He argues that abled people can own X if they create the opportunity for disabled people as much as they can own X. And, that creates equal opportunity of welfare. It means that the richest man of the world can own anything else if he creates the opportunity to own it for me and other people. Otsuka’s points are consistent with my arguments that I have mentioned. But, his system also includes some unfairness(18). He supports income tax and luxury tax at the same time to create opportunity of welfare. However, that creates double tax for the consumer and that is unfair. Suppose that a person gains 30000$ in a month and the state takes 5000 to create equal opportunity for welfare. And the person decided to buy a diamond and because it is a luxurious item, government taxes it again when equality has already achieved and that creates unfairness. Money(income) is a tool for using worldly resources, we cannot differentiate them and tax both, that would also create inequality of opportunity.

      In this paper, I have attempted to show why it is not contradictory to support distributive justice and robust private property right. I have firstly shown why private property right is natural. Unlike many philosophers I argued that even if there are several arguments for p.p. rights and these arguments have a force against people who think that p.p. rights is a myth, we need theological reasons to clarify that property ownership is a natural right. Then I argued that because we live in a society, p.p. right makes equality of opportunity necessary and thereby I critiqued Nozick. Then I have criticized Otsuka’s theory for egalitarian liberalism. I concluded that like Otsuka, there is no conflict between egalitarian policies and p.p. rights.



[1] Hume, D., & Mossner, E. (1984). A treatise of human nature (Reprinted 1984 ed., The pelican classics. philosophy). London: Penguin Books. 3. Part.
[2] Locke, John. Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay. Alex Catalogue, 199AD. INSERT-MISSING-DATABASE-NAME, INSERT-MISSING-URL. Accessed 2019.

[3] Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, a Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2013. Page 164

[4] Otsuka, M. (2009). Libertarianism without inequality (Reprinted, 2009 ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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