2 Ekim 2019 Çarşamba

Discussion of innate ideas



                                                 Discussion of innate ideas

     Innatism is the view that people have inborn ideas in their minds and the mind is not empty. In this essay, I will argue that there are two main resaons to adopt innatism instead of Lockeian emprisism. First is that language acquisition process supports the existence of innate ideas and Second, the existence of moral values support innate knowledge.

     Locke argues that every idea that humans have can be explained in the sense of learning from sensation. So, he argues that, we don’t need any extended claim as there are ideas or knowledge human have inborn or so called innately. Everything including rules of logic, mathematics and axiological propositions are learned with sense experiences. He thinks that our minds were a blank slate as he calls tabula rasa when we were born. Innatists like Leibniz and Descartes, on the other hand, argue that the mind is not a blank slate but it includes ideas like God, mathematics etc. Locke rejects this idea and argues there is no good reason to assume the existence of innatism.

    Leibniz argues that innate ideas exist. He thinks that our mind is like a Veined marble. Sensations do not create but cause the emergence of our inborn ideas. Leibniz rightly argues that if there is no innate a priori knowledge, our generalizations are just products of conditioning. For example, Locke argues that total of angles of a triangle is 180* not because we innately know but because our senses tell us so. So, it is possible that another observation can show that total of angles of another triangle is different. Because ideas do not have to be stable, a triangle can have 180* today and 145 tomorrow. Leibniz says that mathematics has universal values and it is impossible to say that we learn it by sensation. So, mathematical ideas must be in the mind innately.

   I think, Locke does not make a very important differentiation. Locke thinks that we only justify our believes with senses. If Locke is right, all of our generalizations must be epistemologically justified only with respect to amount of repetitions. But I think, we need to make a differentiation between Mathematics and our daily experience. For example, I always see that when I press the keyboard, a letter appears on the screen. I have experienced it maybe a billion times. On the other hand, I have just firstly calculated that totals of angles of an octagon is 1080*. Even if Locke would argue that my idea of octagon is a complex idea and reduce it to the basic ones, I don’t experience them as much as my some other belief that seem weaker like my belief of keyboard. Rules of mathematics do not seem changeable. But even if my senses experience it a billion times, I am not sure whether a letter appears when I press the keyboard. But we think that the most warrant belief is not about keyboard but octagon. Locke has to say that my belief about the keyboard is more trustable but it clearly makes no sense. So, when we generalize things we have at least two categories. First includes mathematics, logic etc., repeated sensory experiences. First one is justified regardless of senses but second needs sensory experiences. And first is always more trustable than the second. If logic and mathematics are not innate or if these categories that decides first one more trustable are not innate, there is no other explanation for the difference between these two beliefs in the sense of justification. But because we know there is a difference beyond sensory experiences we can say that either ideas of mathematics are innate or categories that categorize justification levels of knowledge is innate. If first case is true, we know mathematics is inborn. If second is true we learn mathematics by experience but categories in mind categorizes the knowledge. In both cases, mind is not tabula rasa.    

     Language acquisition process also supports innatism. Noam Chomsky critiqued the empiricist understanding of language. Skinner’s empiricist understanding of language acquisition has two bases. First, children hear the utterances and see response to it and second, children remember the reinforcement. It means that language is just about observing utterances and response to the words[1]. It means that language is a product of response mechanism of a brain. So, we cannot use sentences that we did not experience. But Chomsky argued that without an innate language acquisition device in mind, it is impossible to establish sentences in a right grammatical structure. As he says, firstly language is not like a response mechanism because we can use any words to a behavior; second, we don’t need memory of historical reinforcements to say something. Chomsky rightly points out that language is a very complex phenomenon, it includes a complex grammar structure. Without an innate mechanism that can organize the words and create an understandable sentence is almost impossible[2]. Chomsky does not mean that grammar structure is completely innate. He argues that there is a universal grammar and we know that innately but universal grammar does not include all grammar structures. And then we learn language which have different grammar structures with an innate mechanism that knows how a human language is possible structured. So, what the innate idea is a mechanism that can organize the words with respect to possible human languages. When we learn language, this mechanism works and creates a grammar structure according to the language that we hear. This understanding is close to the view of the mind as a veined marble in the sense of innate ideas of Universal Grammar and innate mechanism that we can learn the grammar structure of a language. But Locke’s understanding of mind does not even accept a mechanism that creates a grammar structure.

     Third point is that we have moral laws innately. Locke argued that we learn moral laws from nature. Firstly, normative propositions are axiological. But there is no observable axiological phenomenon in the nature. David Hume, famous Scottish philosopher, argued that nature does not include morality. He argues that we observe the universe as “is” not as “ought to”. For example, I observe that there is a table in front of me but I never observe that there ought to be a table in front of me. So, observable nature does not include morality. Thus, if ethical realism is true and there are universal moral laws, they must be in the mind without observation. In addition, not only normative propositions but also moral concepts seem innate. Is seeing something bad the same as seeing matter? Locke would argue that what you call bad is not observable because it is a complex idea. But I don’t think it can be learnable. So, I argue that, moral concepts such as good and bad, just and unjust, right and wrong are very complex and it is almost impossible to learn them. I don’t remember that I learned that killing a person is bad. Furthermore, we don’t have to teach a child to hurt anyone is bad. In addition, children have strong moral capacities. Paul bloom argues that children have innate concepts of good and bad innately and he supports his argument with scientific experiment. According to the experiment made in Yale university, even 6 mounts old babies have tendency to get closer to helpers and get away from the bad people.[3]

I believe that there can sensibly be two explanations for moral propositions in our minds. First, as Rawls argues that we have a mechanism moral concept or law creator in mind like Chomsky argued for language or all knowledge exists in the mind innately. Both means rejection the Lockean understandings of mind(41)[4].

To sum up, there are at least several reasons to prefer innatism to Lockean empiricism. Language and morality cannot be sensibly explained with the idea of mind as tabula rasa. They are either created with an innate mechanism in mind or they exist in mind



[1] Cowie, F. (2008, January 16). Innateness and Language. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/innateness-language/
[2]  Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory Of Syntax, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1965.
[3] Bloom, “The Moral Life of Babies”, The New York Times, 5 May 2010. (I read it from here http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/NewspaperArticles/MoralLifeBabies.pdf)
[4] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999

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