Discussion of innate ideas

                                                 Discussion of innate ideas

     Innatism is the view that people have inborn ideas in their minds and the mind is not empty. In this essay, I will argue that there are two main resaons to adopt innatism instead of Lockeian emprisism. First is that language acquisition process supports the existence of innate ideas and Second, the existence of moral values support innate knowledge.

     Locke argues that every idea that humans have can be explained in the sense of learning from sensation. So, he argues that, we don’t need any extended claim as there are ideas or knowledge human have inborn or so called innately. Everything including rules of logic, mathematics and axiological propositions are learned with sense experiences. He thinks that our minds were a blank slate as he calls tabula rasa when we were born. Innatists like Leibniz and Descartes, on the other hand, argue that the mind is not a blank slate but it includes ideas like God, mathematics etc. Locke rejects this idea and argues there is no good reason to assume the existence of innatism.

    Leibniz argues that innate ideas exist. He thinks that our mind is like a Veined marble. Sensations do not create but cause the emergence of our inborn ideas. Leibniz rightly argues that if there is no innate a priori knowledge, our generalizations are just products of conditioning. For example, Locke argues that total of angles of a triangle is 180* not because we innately know but because our senses tell us so. So, it is possible that another observation can show that total of angles of another triangle is different. Because ideas do not have to be stable, a triangle can have 180* today and 145 tomorrow. Leibniz says that mathematics has universal values and it is impossible to say that we learn it by sensation. So, mathematical ideas must be in the mind innately.

   I think, Locke does not make a very important differentiation. Locke thinks that we only justify our believes with senses. If Locke is right, all of our generalizations must be epistemologically justified only with respect to amount of repetitions. But I think, we need to make a differentiation between Mathematics and our daily experience. For example, I always see that when I press the keyboard, a letter appears on the screen. I have experienced it maybe a billion times. On the other hand, I have just firstly calculated that totals of angles of an octagon is 1080*. Even if Locke would argue that my idea of octagon is a complex idea and reduce it to the basic ones, I don’t experience them as much as my some other belief that seem weaker like my belief of keyboard. Rules of mathematics do not seem changeable. But even if my senses experience it a billion times, I am not sure whether a letter appears when I press the keyboard. But we think that the most warrant belief is not about keyboard but octagon. Locke has to say that my belief about the keyboard is more trustable but it clearly makes no sense. So, when we generalize things we have at least two categories. First includes mathematics, logic etc., repeated sensory experiences. First one is justified regardless of senses but second needs sensory experiences. And first is always more trustable than the second. If logic and mathematics are not innate or if these categories that decides first one more trustable are not innate, there is no other explanation for the difference between these two beliefs in the sense of justification. But because we know there is a difference beyond sensory experiences we can say that either ideas of mathematics are innate or categories that categorize justification levels of knowledge is innate. If first case is true, we know mathematics is inborn. If second is true we learn mathematics by experience but categories in mind categorizes the knowledge. In both cases, mind is not tabula rasa.    

     Language acquisition process also supports innatism. Noam Chomsky critiqued the empiricist understanding of language. Skinner’s empiricist understanding of language acquisition has two bases. First, children hear the utterances and see response to it and second, children remember the reinforcement. It means that language is just about observing utterances and response to the words[1]. It means that language is a product of response mechanism of a brain. So, we cannot use sentences that we did not experience. But Chomsky argued that without an innate language acquisition device in mind, it is impossible to establish sentences in a right grammatical structure. As he says, firstly language is not like a response mechanism because we can use any words to a behavior; second, we don’t need memory of historical reinforcements to say something. Chomsky rightly points out that language is a very complex phenomenon, it includes a complex grammar structure. Without an innate mechanism that can organize the words and create an understandable sentence is almost impossible[2]. Chomsky does not mean that grammar structure is completely innate. He argues that there is a universal grammar and we know that innately but universal grammar does not include all grammar structures. And then we learn language which have different grammar structures with an innate mechanism that knows how a human language is possible structured. So, what the innate idea is a mechanism that can organize the words with respect to possible human languages. When we learn language, this mechanism works and creates a grammar structure according to the language that we hear. This understanding is close to the view of the mind as a veined marble in the sense of innate ideas of Universal Grammar and innate mechanism that we can learn the grammar structure of a language. But Locke’s understanding of mind does not even accept a mechanism that creates a grammar structure.

     Third point is that we have moral laws innately. Locke argued that we learn moral laws from nature. Firstly, normative propositions are axiological. But there is no observable axiological phenomenon in the nature. David Hume, famous Scottish philosopher, argued that nature does not include morality. He argues that we observe the universe as “is” not as “ought to”. For example, I observe that there is a table in front of me but I never observe that there ought to be a table in front of me. So, observable nature does not include morality. Thus, if ethical realism is true and there are universal moral laws, they must be in the mind without observation. In addition, not only normative propositions but also moral concepts seem innate. Is seeing something bad the same as seeing matter? Locke would argue that what you call bad is not observable because it is a complex idea. But I don’t think it can be learnable. So, I argue that, moral concepts such as good and bad, just and unjust, right and wrong are very complex and it is almost impossible to learn them. I don’t remember that I learned that killing a person is bad. Furthermore, we don’t have to teach a child to hurt anyone is bad. In addition, children have strong moral capacities. Paul bloom argues that children have innate concepts of good and bad innately and he supports his argument with scientific experiment. According to the experiment made in Yale university, even 6 mounts old babies have tendency to get closer to helpers and get away from the bad people.[3]

I believe that there can sensibly be two explanations for moral propositions in our minds. First, as Rawls argues that we have a mechanism moral concept or law creator in mind like Chomsky argued for language or all knowledge exists in the mind innately. Both means rejection the Lockean understandings of mind(41)[4].

To sum up, there are at least several reasons to prefer innatism to Lockean empiricism. Language and morality cannot be sensibly explained with the idea of mind as tabula rasa. They are either created with an innate mechanism in mind or they exist in mind

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[1] Cowie, F. (2008, January 16). Innateness and Language. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/innateness-language/

[2]  Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory Of Syntax, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1965.

[3] Bloom, “The Moral Life of Babies”, The New York Times, 5 May 2010. (I read it from here http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/NewspaperArticles/MoralLifeBabies.pdf)

[4] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999

Is it possible to create equality and private property rights together?

     I, like all people, live as me, as an individual being. But like all people, I live in a society. But which is first: Am I just responsible for myself or for society? The answer to that question determines our understanding of rights and state. If we think that our basic rights such as living, speaking or having private property is given by the state or society, then we can argue that they can be taken back by society or society can interfere with these rights. If we think that our basic rights are natural, then they are untouchable by society. This question also creates a big discussion between those who support redistributive political theories and private property rights. In this essay, I will attempt to show that we can argue that we can have private property rights and an equal society together. I will argue that our property rights are natural and untouchable but because natural resources are limited, the less advantaged group should be fed because any kind of consumption of private property right of a person limits the potential usage of property rights of others. Thus, I will try to substantiate the idea that it is possible when our rights are natural and untouchable, we can still be responsible for others. Firstly, I will explain why our right of property right is natural. In the second paragraph, I will explain why private property rights make equal society necessary and then I will look at Otsuka’s argument for liberalism without inequality and compare them with my ideas which I will reflect.

     I define property ownership right as having private right of permanent usage and transfer of a nonrational thing. Private property right seems like one of our most basic right. When we go to the forest and catch an apple, we feel that we have right of usage of the apple at least more than others. That is a universal feeling and character of human nature. When our labor interferes with a thing, we feel a kind of engagement with that thing. Assume that I live in a world and I believe that no one lives in the universe except me, I have my own house and car in this world. But then aliens, whom I did not know existed before come to my world and they ask me if they have the right to use my house and car because no social contract exists yet that makes me the owner of that house and car. Everyone would agree that there is no reason to think that I need to have social contract with aliens to be the owner of the house and car and what aliens do (using my house and car) is morally wrong. If that is true, it means that private property right does not come from society or a social contract, but it is natural. So, my argument is as follows:

1.     Private property right either comes from a social contract or it is natural

2.     Private property right can’t come from a social contract

2.a-) it is immoral to use others’ belongings (alien example)

2.b-) private property is an undeniable natural feeling (apple example)

      C. Private property right is natural

    But there are several serious possible objections to the argument. First, I probably built my house on the houses of some animals (ant, bee, etc.). But I do not think that I violate their p.p rights. So, the question might arise: What about animal rights? We should we say that humans have private property rights when other animals do not. Here followers of Kant(such as Nozick and Rawls) would use this separation of human and animal with respect to that humans have reason unlike animals, that Kantian idea makes animals out of morality and so, it is difficult to argue because it means there are no animal rights. Thus, I don’t find his solution plausible. The second possible serious objection is that we said that we naturally feel that we own something when our labor interferes with it but why does such a feeling make something right? Can natural feelings create rights? Scottish philosopher David Hume argues that our knowledge of the world does not imply how the world should be (is ought to problem)[1]. So, we cannot claim that private property is a right because any kind of reason for that proposition includes normativity. But even if objections are strong it is possible to make theological arguments for the superiority of humans and that private property is a God given right like Locke made in the first chapter of the second essay on civil government[2]. And the idea that private property right is natural is still stronger than the idea that it comes from a social contract because defenders of p.p. rights come from social contract can’t still find a sufficient explanation for the alien and apple examples.
    We concluded that private property rights are natural. It means that every political theory must respect p.p rights. Robert Nozick argues that no one can use another’s labor and that is a kind of slavery[3]. Therefore, tax cannot include services to reduce inequality or feed less advantaged groups because that would be a violation of payer’s right on his labor. In contrast, left libertarians such as Michael Otsuka think that government tax for less advantaged groups is not a violation to the p.p. right. I agree with Otsuka that taxing an advantaged group and supporting a less advantaged group is not a violation of private property rights because the sources of the world are limited and any kind of profit of the advantaged group decreases the potential profit of the less advantaged group. If we had unlimited resources, we could fairly say that we have property rights of all and Lockean proviso that everyone has the ultimate right of p.p would work in such a situation. In such a world having a private property would not violate other’s potential right of making it. But because there are no unlimited resources for anybody, we have to respect others p.p rights, otherwise we would violate their property rights and that is basically unfair. We can formulate the argument in that sense:

1-) An agent has the right of property ownership only if his ownership does not violate others p.p. rights.

2-) Having private property without making a less advantaged group better off is a violation of their possible usage of worldly resources.

C-) Private property ownership requires making a less advantaged group better off.

So, feeding a less advantaged group is a part of private property right. If we go back to our alien example, in that world, we assumed nobody exists except us but then aliens come along. We can say that until aliens come, we had the permanent right of usage of everything in the world naturally until we realized other beings. After we realized their existence, we cannot say that the world is ours and that would be a violation of their p.p. rights because the world would have been their property as well, had we not existed. To defend, their p.p. rights we accept that we need to make them better off. Because everyone has p.p. rights inborn and another necessary condition for using that right is to be alive, the advantaged group must keep other people alive, otherwise it would also be a violation of their potential p.p. rights. As a result, society must consider basic needs of agents and the advantaged group should make the less advantaged group better off when they make profit or own private property.

    This argument should not be confused with Rawls’ difference principle. In his difference principle, he argues that people can have p.p. if they make others better off. Because Rawls firstly considers how just society would be. However, I don’t plan such a just society but focus on the nature of p.p. right and its necessities. I argue that considering others’ potential property right is not for creating a just society, but it is the right itself. 

    Otsuka has shown a very important critique of Lockean proviso. He says that Lockean proviso includes the possibility of an unfree society because it is possible that one can own everything. And it is difficult to argue a libertarian argument which includes the possibility of tyranny in itself[4].

   Otsuka also argues that forced labor and p.p. right are not contradictory. He also argues that a society must be egalitarian that includes equal opportunity for welfare. His society is more egalitarian than even Rawls because he argues people should work for unfortunates to permanently have properties and that is a duty for them. He argues that abled people can own X if they create the opportunity for disabled people as much as they can own X. And, that creates equal opportunity of welfare. It means that the richest man of the world can own anything else if he creates the opportunity to own it for me and other people. Otsuka’s points are consistent with my arguments that I have mentioned. But, his system also includes some unfairness(18). He supports income tax and luxury tax at the same time to create opportunity of welfare. However, that creates double tax for the consumer and that is unfair. Suppose that a person gains 30000$ in a month and the state takes 5000 to create equal opportunity for welfare. And the person decided to buy a diamond and because it is a luxurious item, government taxes it again when equality has already achieved and that creates unfairness. Money(income) is a tool for using worldly resources, we cannot differentiate them and tax both, that would also create inequality of opportunity.

      In this paper, I have attempted to show why it is not contradictory to support distributive justice and robust private property right. I have firstly shown why private property right is natural. Unlike many philosophers I argued that even if there are several arguments for p.p. rights and these arguments have a force against people who think that p.p. rights is a myth, we need theological reasons to clarify that property ownership is a natural right. Then I argued that because we live in a society, p.p. right makes equality of opportunity necessary and thereby I critiqued Nozick. Then I have criticized Otsuka’s theory for egalitarian liberalism. I concluded that like Otsuka, there is no conflict between egalitarian policies and p.p. rights.

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[1] Hume, D., & Mossner, E. (1984). A treatise of human nature (Reprinted 1984 ed., The pelican classics. philosophy). London: Penguin Books. 3. Part.

[2] Locke, John. Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay. Alex Catalogue, 199AD. INSERT-MISSING-DATABASE-NAME, INSERT-MISSING-URL. Accessed 2019.

[3] Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, a Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2013. Page 164

[4] Otsuka, M. (2009). Libertarianism without inequality (Reprinted, 2009 ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cartesian circle, Was Descartes' logic circular

     The Cartesian Circle is a claim that argues the Cartesian argument about existence of clear and distinct ideas are dependent on existence of God is circular. I argue that the claim is wrong and therefore, Descartes’s argument is not circular because we don’t need to know that God exists for saying that our clear and distinct perceptions are true (psychologically certain). But to say that our memory is trustable and more importantly our clear perceptions are objectively true beyond our perception, we need to say that God exists.

The Cartesian circle is a claim that follows:

1.     Descartes argues that clear and distinct ideas are true only if God exists and is not a deceiver.

2.     To know that God exists, I need to say that clear and distinct ideas are true

So, they claim there is a circularity between these propositions. The famous response to the claim from Descartes is rejecting 1 in reply to objections (146): He does not argue that clear and distinct ideas are not certain, so God does not guarantee these ideas, but he guarantees my c&d memories.

  Let’s suppose that an atheist is solving a problem about a triangle and to solve the problem he needs to remember that he c&d perceived three angles of a triangle equals to two right angles, he cannot say that “oh! I remember that three angles are equal to two right angles” because without the existence of God he cannot be sure if his memory is correct.

1.     I remember that I c&d perceived three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles(p)

2.     My memory is trustable therefore I can say that I did perceive p

C: I clearly and distinctly perceive that three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles

Descartes rejects the second premise. He thinks that second premise is true only if God exists. It actually means that science and even mathematics is impossible for Atheists. Because they always have to question their memory.

 An objector can argue that we use memory to prove God. Suppose that an argument goes like this: S entailed Q, Q entailed p then at last p entailed r. But when we reach r, don’t we need to remember c&d perception of S to prove r; if this is the case proving existence of God is impossible. Willis Doney thinks that Descartes states, after the reaching r, we can see that there is a necessary connection between s-q-p-r and they all are present in the mind at the same time(328). And that clearly shows we don’t need to use memory to know something present in mind.

     So, it seems that we get rid of the problem but it is not easy as much. Descartes thinks that our c&d perceptions are open to doubt. Descartes in the 35. Paragraph of meditations(4. Paragraph of 3. Meditation) says that even my clear and distinct perception of 3+2=5 is open to doubt because an evil genius can trick us into thinking so. What Descartes and many philosophers think that to say that c&d perception is objectively true, we need an all-good God. This shows that Cartesian doubt includes our clear and distinct ideas. Descartes, for one, is a radical doubter. For Descartes, we don’t need to perceive the doubt but we just need to say that the doubt is epistemically possible. So, without perceiving that our doubt is clearly and distinctly wrong, we cannot say that our perception is objectively true. But firstly, we need to talk about the difference between psychological certainty and metaphysical(normative) certainty. Psychological certainty is our subjective certainty and it forces us to believe it. On the other hand, metaphysical certainty includes objectiveness and it means p is real beyond myself and my perception. Alan Gewirth argues that God guarantees only metaphysical certainty and if this is the case we can say that there is no circle(372). I think Gewirth is right and Descartes was aware of it and he thought that even the c&d perceptions are just psychologically certain until we prove that God exists and his veracity makes what we are psychologically certain, metaphysically certain. What I think, Descartes argues that “I think therefore I am” is not objective truth until the 4. Meditation that he understood that God exists and is not a deceiver. So, in the beginning there was just psychological certainty of my existence and some other c&d perceptions that Descartes used to show the existence of God, and they were just psychologically certain, so, they were still open to doubt. But after we concluded that God is not a deceiver, we can claim our c&d perceptions are metaphysically certain. So, we get rid of the circle by saying that what Descartes mean c&d perception is psychological certainty. On the other hand, he claims that they did not have metaphysical certainty until God’s veracity made all c&d perceptions metaphysically certain. So, as I mentioned we reject (1) and say that we don’t need God to say that c&d ideas are true. But it was just in psychological sense. Here we say that we reject (2) and concluded that God is essential to say that c&d perceptions are true and it is just in metaphysical sense. But does not mean that we are not certain of c&d ideas are true without God(Q). We are certain but we are not certain of Q. 

1. If c&d ideas are objectively certain, there must be no epistemically possible doubt

2. Only if God exists and he is a not a deceiver, doubt is epistemically impossible

3. God is not a deceiver

C: All c&d ideas are objectively true

We said that radical doubt leads to him to doubt his c&d perceptions that are psychologically certain. But why do we doubt them, radical doubt only includes ideas that are open to doubt but is the cogito argument open to doubt? James Van Cleve argues in his essay that Cartesian doubt does not need certainty, so we don’t need to c&d perceive the doubt itself (63). Cartesian doubt still exists because even doubting cogito is epistemically possible. In his argument, he says that I can think a scenario that a proposition is evident to me and Demon hypothesis is true, it means p is false. So, it is epistemically possible to say that I can doubt the psychological certainty. As a result, theists have one more advantage than atheists. Like memory, when theists are certain of the truth of propositions of their c&d perceptions whereas atheists are not. Even if Atheists are certain that they exist(S), the proposition is still open to doubt.

But there can be big objection: We said that psychological certainties are open to doubt but we proved the existence of God with these ideas. It seems there is still a circularity, we have to say that c&d ideas are not open to doubt (metaphysically certain) to say that God exists. But as I mentioned I did not say that I am not certain of c&d perceptions are true (Q) but I am in doubt whether Q is true because as I showed in the previous paragraph the propositions of c&d ideas are true, is still in doubt. Van Cleve argues that we don’t have to say that these propositions are close to doubt; until we can say that clear and distinct perceptions are true, we can still conclude that God exists (67). So, he uses these ideas as a knowledge maker. Descartes uses clear and distinct ideas as impossible to not believe in them. Therefore, we cannot say that c&d ideas are uncertain therefore we can use them to prove God.

To sum up, we have shown that cartesian circle is not a real circle. When Descartes argues that truth of our c&d perception dependent of God who is not a deceiver, he means not psychological certainty but metaphysical certainty. Furthermore, he thinks that c&d perceptions are psychologically certain for all people but only theists can trust their memories therefore psychological certainty of clear and distinct perceptions about past exists only if we believe in God who is not a deceiver.

Works Cited

Doney, Willis. “The Cartesian Circle.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 16, no. 3, 1955, pp. 324–338. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2707635.

Gewirtz, Alan. “The Cartesian Circle.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 50, no. 4, 1941, pp. 368–395. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2181069.

Cleve, James Van. “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 88, no. 1, 1979, pp. 55–55., doi:10.2307/2184779.